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Abstract Given the extremely limited hardware resources
on sensor nodes and the inclement deploying environment,
the adversary Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack becomes a
serious security threat toward wireless sensor networks.
Without adequate defense mechanism, the adversary can
simply inundate the network by ﬂooding the bogus data
packets, and paralyze the partial or whole sensor network by
depleting node battery power. Prior work on false packet
ﬁltering in sensor networks are mostly based on symmetric
keyschemes,withtheconcernthatthepublickeyoperations
are too expensive for the resource constrained sensors.
Recent progress in public key implementations on sensors,
however, has shown that public key is already feasible for
sensors. In this paper, we present PDF, a Public-key based
false Data Filtering scheme that leverages Shamir’s thresh-
old cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC),
and effectively rejects 100% of false data packets. We
evaluate PDF by real world implementation on MICAz
motes. Our experiment results support the conclusion that
PDF is practical for real world sensor deployment.
Keywords Sensor networks   Denial of service  
Authentication   ECC
1 Introduction
The repertoire of sensor network applications requires an
inclement and human unattended environment, such as
battleﬁeld surveillance, wild animal habitat monitoring, and
environmental monitoring.Given the extremely constrained
hardware resources of the sensor nodes, the adversary
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack becomes a serious security
threat. The adversary can ﬁrst compromise an individual
low-power sensor, and then inundate the whole network by
injecting large amounts of bogus data packets into the
network through the compromised node. These bogus
messages ﬂood the network, deplete the battery power of
the sensor nodes, and ﬁnally paralyze the whole network.
This problem has attracted many attentions in the past
several years. Most of prior work [1–4], except [5], on
sensor network message authentication and bogus data
ﬁltering mainly rely on symmetric key schemes. Ye et al.
[1, 2] proposed a statistical en-route false report ﬁltering
scheme (SEF). The scheme requires each report be
endorsed by multiple sensor nodes by encrypting the report
with their random pre-distributed symmetric keys. The
intermediate nodes on the route compare their own keys
with those used for encrypting the report, and check the
corresponding encryption if matched keys are found. Since
the authentication capability of the intermediate nodes
depends on the probabilistic key sharing, only a portion of
bogus messages can be detected and dropped. If the com-
munication is between two remote sensor nodes, the
receiver still cannot know, with a certain probability,
whether or not the message is valid. Zhu et al. [4] proposed
an Interleaved Hop-by-hop Authentication scheme (IHA)
to detect the false report. The protocol requires that the
sensor nodes maintain a pre-route interleaved associations
so that any sensor shares each secret with its upper asso-
ciated node and lower associated sensor. The problem of
this approach is that it is not practical for large sensor
networks. Many times, the message routing paths are not
determined due to the unpredictable nature of wireless
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edge of the networks, which is very difﬁcult to get for large
scale sensor networks. Further, this scheme only ﬁlters the
false report which is sent to the sink. The sensor nodes have
no ability to authenticate the messages between the sensor
nodes since the corresponding association knowledge is not
available.
Unlike the symmetric key based schemes, the public key
approach [5] proposed by Zhang et al. yields better security
resilience. Unfortunately, the bilinear pairing based scheme
is too expensive to be afforded by the low-power sensor
hardware. Another straightforward public-key based
approach is to use the public-key infrastructure (PKI) that is
widely used on Internet, e.g., X509. However, PKI cannot
be directly used on sensor networks due to following three
issues. First, public key size is normally large, such as 128
bytes for 1024-bit RSA. Sensors are extremely resource
constrained devices. The distribution of public keys in
sensor network would cause high communication overhead,
which in turn will reduce the battery life. Second, the public
key has to be certiﬁed before it can be used to verify a
signature. It is difﬁcult to have an on-line CA in sensor
networks. The workaround solution is to attach a certiﬁcate
with the public key. But again it would cause more com-
munication overhead since the certiﬁcate has the same data
length as the public key. Third, the simple scheme is not
resilient to defend against DoS attacks. If a sensor is com-
promised, the adversary then uses it to send a large number
of messages with legitimate signatures (of the compromised
sensor).
In this paper, we propose a Public-key based false Data
Filtering scheme (PDF), which leverages threshold cryp-
tography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). As we
will show, ECC is more affordable than other public key
schemes for sensors. With carefully devised ECC-based
security protocols and optimized ECC primitive imple-
mentation on sensor nodes, ECC is very practical on
extremely resource constrained devices. In PDF, any event
report message requires an attached digital signature which
is signed by system private key. Due to the threat of node
compromise, any single sensor cannot be trusted to keep
the system private key and be allowed to generate the
system signature. Instead, with the assumption that the
adversary can not compromise up to t sensors, we design a
threshold endorsement scheme. We ﬁrst pre-distribute a
unique system secret share to every individual sensor
during the network deployment. Upon the detection of an
event, the group of sensor nodes that detect the event
collaborate together and jointly generate a system signa-
ture. The intermediate sensor nodes can easily validate the
event report by efﬁciently verifying the attached signature.
Unlike the symmetric key based schemes that only support
false data ﬁltering for the sink bounded messages, PDF
supports any point to point communication in the sensor
network.
Since it is computationally infeasible for the adversary
to forge a digital signature without knowing the system
secret, any false report will be detected with 100% prob-
ability. PDF is also resilient to sensor compromising attack.
The threshold cryptography guarantees the system secret
will not be revealed as long as no more than t - 1( t is a
system parameter) sensors are compromised. We have
implemented all the components for the false data ﬁltering
scheme on the real world sensor nodes and shown the
performance of the public-key based scheme is practical.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as
follows. First, we propose a public-key based false data
ﬁltering scheme for sensor networks. Different from sym-
metric key based schemes, our scheme is able to ﬁlter out
the false data with 100% probability and support any end-
to-end communication in sensor networks. Second, we
carefully design a threshold signature generation scheme
that allows a number of low-power and untrusted sensors to
cooperatively and efﬁciently generate a system digital sig-
nature. Our threshold signature generation scheme can also
be applied in other applications, such user access control.
Third, we have implemented all the components for our
proposed scheme, including the ECC public-key primitive
suite for MICAz sensor motes. Our experiment results
prove that PDF is practical for real world applications.
2 Related work
Sensor network security has attracted extensive attentions
in recent years. Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random
graph based key pre-distribution scheme [6]. The scheme
assigns each sensor a random subset of keys from a large
key pool, and allows any two nodes to ﬁnd one common key
with a certain probability and use that key as their shared
symmetric key. Based on their contribution, a number of
researches [7–11] have been delivered to strengthen the
security and improve the efﬁciency. Researchers found
the sensor deployment information can be used to reduce
the number of pre-loaded keys and meanwhile improve the
key connectivity. Instead of pre-distributing random keys,
schemes [9, 10] pre-loads either secret matrices or secret
polynomials in the sensors to improve the connectivity and
reduce the overhead. Recently, this method is also adopted
in heterogeneous sensor networks [12, 13]. Although the
symmetric key based schemes are efﬁcient in computation,
they all require considerable memory space and commu-
nication overhead for key pre-distribution and key discov-
ery. The public key based pair-wise key schemes proposed
by Zhang et al. [5, 14] achieve some nice security features
by using ID-based cryptography. Unfortunately, it is still a
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resource constrained sensors.
The most related research to our work are [1–4]. Zhu
et al. [4] proposed an Interleaved Hop-by-hop Authenti-
cation scheme (IHA) to detect the false report. The pro-
tocol requires that the sensor nodes maintain a pre-route
interleaved associations so that any sensor shares each
secret with its upper associated node and lower associated
sensor. Ye et al. [2] proposed a statistical en-route false
report ﬁltering scheme (SEF). The scheme requires each
report be endorsed by multiple sensor nodes by encrypt-
ing the report with their random pre-distributed symmetric
keys. The intermediate nodes on the route compare their
own keys with those used for encrypting the report, and
check the corresponding encryption if matched keys are
found. If the corresponding encryption does not match,
the report is considered as a forged one and dropped. A
more sophisticated en-route false report ﬁltering scheme
is proposed by Yang et al. [1]. Based on SEF, this scheme
pre-distributes the symmetric keys in a way that the keys
are associated with the sensor location (in the granularity
of a cell). This scheme is more resilient than SEF because
the adversary has to compromise a number of sensors in a
same location to forge an event report, which is consid-
ered more difﬁcult and easier to be detected. Besides the
above symmetric key based schemes, Zhang et al. pro-
pose a Probabilistic En-route Filtering scheme [5]b y
threshold-endorsement using ID-based cryptography. The
scheme is more resilient and more effective than the
symmetric key schemes in defending against the various
security attacks, such as Sybil and node duplicates.
However, as we mentioned, the computation is still too
expensive for practical implementation on real world
sensor networks.
The threshold cryptography adopted in this paper was
also studied for ad hoc network security in prior work
[15, 16]. The main difference is that sensor nodes have
extremely limited resources, including CPU, memory,
storage and battery power. As a result, their solutions
cannot be practically applied to sensor networks. We are
the ﬁrst to implement threshold cryptography in practice
for sensor networks. We carefully design the protocol to
show threshold cryptography is affordable and practical for
real sensor network deployment.
3 Network and security model
We consider a large scale wireless sensor network deployed
in a variety of environments. Sensor nodes are the low-cost
wireless devices and have very limited hardware resources
including processor, memory and energy. Upon detection of
an event, the sensor nodes generate event report packets and
send them back to the sink through multihop routing. For
the event detection that needs the collaboration of a group
of nearby sensors, we assume the sensor clustering protocol,
as proposed in prior work [17–23], has been already
deployed. The event report is generated by the sensor
cluster and transmitted to the sink by the multi-hop routing
protocol. We assume the sensor network routing scheme,
such as Directed Diffusion [24], LEACH [22] or GPSR
[25], is also deployed.
The sensor network security is managed by a Certiﬁ-
cation Authority (CA), which is responsible for generating
all security credentials and distributing the secret keys. Due
to the constrained resources and costly wireless commu-
nications on sensors, the CA can not be online and acces-
sible as the way it runs in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Instead, the CA only runs during the network deployment,
system rekeying, or sensor replenishing period. Since the
CA has to be off-line in most of time, each sensor has to be
pre-loaded with its private key, public key and certiﬁcate
before the deployment. Each sensor uses these keys to
build the secure communication channels with its neigh-
boring sensors as well as perform future sensing tasks.
An adversary is assumed to use all possible means to
attack the message authentication mechanism in the sensor
network. To capture the system secret, the adversary may
launch either passive or active attacks. A typical passive
attack is message eavesdropping. The active attacks,
however, may include Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and
sensor compromise. Due to the limited hardware resources,
sensor nodes may be compromised upon capture. In this
paper, we assume the adversary can retrieve all secret
information from compromised sensors. However, we
assume that at most t - 1 sensors can be compromised.
The assumption is reasonable because compromising sen-
sors takes time and effort. In addition to the system secret
capture, this paper focuses on the adversary DoS attack.
The adversary may forge the event reports and inundate
these messages in the network in order to deplete the batter
power of sensors and ﬁnally paralyze the network.
Finally, this paper assumes the event detected by a
sensor group (or cluster) with t members is always genuine.
It is true that the adversary may generate a fake event or a
forged value to confuse the base station. The adversary can
inﬂuence the group decision through various attacks, such
as the Sybil attack. However, it is obviously out of the
scope of the security problem addressed in this paper, and
prior work [26, 27] has already proposed schemes to
defend against such attacks. We thus do not explicitly
address the security problem in event detection.
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In this section, we present PDF, a public-key based false
data ﬁltering scheme. The basic idea is to generate a system
signature for each event report so that any intermediate
node with the system public key can easily verify the event
report and drop the false data packets. While public key
signature generation and veriﬁcation have been well
established in Internet, its application in wireless sensor
network poses a unique challenge. To generate a system
signature, the sensor node has to have the system private
key. However, any single sensor cannot be trusted to hold
the secret because it is vulnerable to adversary’s compro-
mise attack. Our PDF solves the problem by using Shamir’s
secret sharing. Instead of giving the system secret to each
individual sensor, PDF distributes the secret in the follow-
ing way: each sensor holds a unique share of the secret and
any t sensor can collaborate together and reconstruct the
secret. Therefore, each event report message has to be
endorsed by t sensor nodes. The t endorsing sensors actually
jointly generate a system signature for the endorsed packet.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. Second, to achieve the least overhead as possible,
we then adopt the ECPVS signature scheme [28]. Third, we
present the threshold endorsement false report ﬁltering
scheme. Finally, we provide the cost and security analysis,
as well as the extension of probabilistic veriﬁcation to
reduce the computation cost.
4.1 Shamir’s secret sharing
We assume CA maintains a system secret polynomial:
fðyÞ¼a0 þ a1y þ a2y2 þ   þat 1yt 1: ð1Þ
a0;a1;...at 1 are random number picked in GF(q). System
secret x is picked as x = a0.
During the sensor network deployment, each sensor
(identiﬁed by si)is pre-distributedwith asecretshare of x.In
particular, the secret share for sensor si is xi ¼ fðsiÞ: Any t
sensor nodes can reconstruct the system secret by Lagrange
interpolation: x ¼
Pt
i¼1lixi; where li ¼
Qt
j¼1;j6¼i
sj
sj si is
Lagrange coefﬁcient. However, it is computationally
infeasible for any t - 1 or less sensors to reconstruct the
system secret.
4.2 ECPVS signature scheme
The typical digital signature scheme in ECC is the elliptic
curve version of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), also
know as ECDSA. ECDSA produces 40 byte signature,
which is much smaller than 128 byte signature of RSA.
However, we are still concerned that the 60-byte message
payload (combining a 20-byte message and its 40-byte
ECDSA signature) is still too large for a typical data packet
for sensor network (e.g., 29 bytes in TinyOS for MICAz
motes). Therefore, we adopt ECPVS signature scheme
which offers smaller signature size than ECDSA.
We describe the ECPVS [28] signature scheme as fol-
lowing. Given a message M, we divide M to CjjV; where C
and V are two parts of the message M, and jCjþj Vj jMj;
because it is necessary to arrange some redundant infor-
mation to be included in C. For example, C holds some
secret information and the signer identity, while V holds
the sender identity, message description, time stamp, etc.
We assume the signer has her private key x, and the cor-
responding public key Q = xP. The signer performs the
following steps to sign the message.
1. Choose a random key k in [1, q - 1];
2. Compute kP, resulting a point with coordinate ðxk; ykÞ;
let r = xk. Check r (mod q), go back to the ﬁrst step if
the result is zero;
3. Compute e = ENC(r, C);
4. Compute d ¼ HðejjVÞ;
5. Compute r ¼ x   d þ k mod q;
6. (e,r) is the digital signature.
The ENC denotes a symmetric-key encryption algo-
rithm. Similarly, we later denote ENC
-1 as a decryption
operation, which usually uses the same symmetric-key
encryption algorithm. The signer sends hV;e;ri to the
receiver. To verify the message M ¼ CjjV and the signa-
ture, the receiver needs to do following steps.
1. Compute d ¼ HðejjVÞ;
2. Compute R = rP - dQ;
3. Compute C ¼ ENC 1ðXðRÞ;eÞ;
4. Check the redundant information in C.
4.3 Threshold signature generation
Our event report signature generation scheme combines the
ECPVS digital signature and Shamir secret sharing scheme
[29] to generate the threshold signature. Examining the
ECPVS protocol presented in Sect. 4.2, the signer has to
have secret k and x. Considering a group of local sensors
are the signer, the challenge of signature generation is how
the group jointly constructs k and x (step 1 of ECPVS
signature generation), the encryption of the content C (in
step 3), and the calculation of sigma (in step 5). Note that
any member of the group should not learn and reveal any
information about k and x, assuming the adversary may
capture all the communications inside the group.
We adopt Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [29] to share
system secret x. To achieve that, CA maintains a secret
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123polynomial: fxðyÞ¼x þ a1y þ   þat 1yt 1: Before being
deployed, each sensor si receives a secret share of fx(y),
which is denoted as xi, and xi ¼ fxðsiÞ: Any t sensors can
reconstruct the system private key: x ¼
Pt
i¼1 xili; where li
is the Lagrange coefﬁcient. Any t - 1 or less sensors, on
the other hand, can not compromise system secret x
because of the threshold property.
Shamir’s secret sharing system discussed above, how-
ever, can not be used to share the secret random number k.
The reason is that ECPVS signature scheme requires the
signer should pick a different random k for a different
signature. Otherwise, an adversary may easily derive sys-
tem secret x by only capturing two signatures generated
from the same k. To share a different random secret k
among the group of sensors each time, we adopt the Joint
Shamir Random secret sharing scheme [29]. This scheme
allows all participating sensors to generate their own ran-
dom secret polynomials (similar to fx(y)) each time. To
share a random secret k, each sensor in turn acts as a dealer
to distribute the share of the secret (of his own polynomial)
to the other members in the group. It should be emphasized
that the polynomial shares must be distributed through the
secure communication channels. We assume sensors
already establish the pair-wise keys with their neighboring
sensors by using existing schemes [6–10, 30]. In particular,
sensor si generates its secret random polynomial fsiðyÞ; and
distributes the share of secret fsiðsjÞ to sensor sj
(1  j  t; j 6¼ i). Then, each sensor receives t - 1 secret
shares from the other t - 1 sensor in the group, and one
share of its own. By combining these t secret shares, each
sensor si computes its own share of k, denoted as ki, and
ki ¼
Pt
j¼1 fsjðsiÞ: The shared secret, as the random number
k, is actually embedded in the polynomial that is the
summation of t secret random polynomial generated by
each of t sensors, gðyÞ¼
Pt
i¼1 fsiðyÞ: The secret k is
determined by: k = g(0). In this way, no sensor in the
group knows the value of k. Any t sensors, however, can
jointly reconstruct k by using Larrange interpolation: k ¼ Pt
i¼1 kili: Again, li is the Lagrange coefﬁcient.
With both k and x shared, the event report threshold
signature generation scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1.W e
assume t sensors, s1;...;st; detect the event, denoted as
M ¼ CjjV; where C can be the secret event measures and V
can be general event description. We also assume s1 is
elected as the group leader. First, t sensors construct kP.
Each sensor si sends its share kiliP to group leader s1 (li is
the Lagrange coefﬁcient), which in-turn sums the t shares
to get kP (by Lagrange interpolation), denoted as R. Then,
s1 broadcasts R to the rest t - 1 sensors. Each sensor uses
R to generate e and d as shown in Fig. 1, computes its share
of the system signature: ri ¼ xilid þ kili; and send it to s1
through the secure communication channel. The summa-
tion of t shares of signatures produces the system signature:
r ¼
Pt
i¼1xilid þ
Pt
i¼1kili ¼ xd þ k: Finally, s1 sends (r,
e, V) to the destination, either the sink or other remote
sensor node.
An important security measure of the above joint sig-
nature generation protocol is not to reveal any of system
secrets, x, k, and individual sensor secret shares, si; xi; at
any step of the protocol. Otherwise, if the group leader is
compromised, then system secrets are compromised. When
kP is constructed to encrypt C (in step 2 of ECPVS), each
sensor si submits kiliP instead of explicit ki, so that secret
share ki is protected by the security property of discrete
logarithm problem, i.e., it is infeasible to derive ki from
kiP. When the signature r is built (in step 5 of ECPVS), the
partial signature ri submitted by each sensor is the linear
combination of two unknown secrets xi; ki; so the group
leader has no way to derive the values of xi; ki from ri.
Overall, all secrets are well protected during the signature
generation by the group.
4.4 Cost analysis
The t endorsing sensors have to jointly generate a random
value k for each event report. To share a random k, each
participating sensor si ﬁrst generates its own random poly-
nomial fsiðyÞ; and calculate the secret shares for other
members in the group. For the group with t members, each
sensor has to compute t shares of the t - 1 degree polyno-
mial, including the one for itself. We will show in the
evaluationthat the polynomial calculation isefﬁcient for the
motes. For the message complexity, each sensorsends t - 1
secret shares to the t - 1 members, and receives t - 1
shares from the t - 1 members. Therefore, each sensor has
to send and receive 2(t - 1) messages.
Note the share of k can be pre-computed. The group of
sensors can run the secret sharing protocol at the idle time
Fig. 1 Event report threshold signature generation scheme by t
sensor nodes, s1,s2,...,st
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123before the event is detected, so the shares of a new k is ready
for the next endorsement as long as the different events do
notoccuratthesamelocation atthesametime.Anotherway
to reduce the communication overhead for k sharing is to
eliminate the k sharing procedure by using pre-computation.
If sensor nodes have enough storage space, CA can pre-
compute different polynomials and pre-load the shares into
the sensors during the deployment. Each share is associated
withanindexnumber.Toendorseanewsignature,thegroup
of sensors only need to negotiate a new index, and use that
share to construct a new random k. In this way, the message
complexity can be reduced to the minimum.
After the shares of k are ready, the most expensive
computation for each sensor si is one ECC point multipli-
cation to compute Pi as shown in Fig. 1. For the message
complexity, each sensor needs to send or receive two points
and one scalar value, which includes its share Pi, the value
of kP, and its share of r.
The event report message consists of r, e and V. Since V
has the half size of e, the total message length is the size of
two and half scalars. The computational cost to verify
the report, as shown in Sect. 4.2, is two ECC point
multiplications.
4.5 Security analysis
Our security analysis of the threshold signature generation
scheme focuses on following two threats. We ﬁrst check
whether or not the adversary can infer the system secret by
compromising one or more sensors and collaborating with
other sensors in signature generation. Second, we examine
the security resilience of secret k sharing because the
compromise of k will lead to the whole system secret
compromise. Note, the security resilience of sharing secret
secret x by any t sensors is guaranteed by Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme. As long as there are no more than t sensors
are compromised, there is no feasible solution to get x.
A compromised group leader certainly may cause
greater security threat than other sensors since the leader
collects more information, so the following analysis is
based on the assumption that the group leader is compro-
mised. The group leader (s1) receives t shares of kP from
other endorsing sensors and derive the value of kP, but the
values of these points do not reveal any information of ki or
k due to the security property of ECC. The group leader s1
also receives t shares of system signature. In each share,
ri ¼ xilid þ kili; there are two unknown values: xi and ki.
Any single or multiple shares combined does not reveal
any information of xi and ki. Therefore, s1 has no way to
determine the system secret x and the random k without
physically compromising the rest t - 1 endorsing sensors.
As we can see, even though s1 can be compromised, the
adversary still cannot obtain the system secret to generate
the signature for his injected data.
The shared random number k has a critical security role
in PDF scheme. As we discussed previously, the compro-
mise of k directly leads the compromise of system secret x.
Therefore, any one or more (less than t) sensors must not
get any information of k during the signature generate,
otherwise the compromise attack may allow the adversary
to acquire k. In Joint Shamir Random Secret sharing
scheme [29], secret k is embedded in the polynomial that is
the combination of each secret polynomial of t sensors.
Each group member si holds a secret share of k, ki. As long
as at least one sensor is not compromised, the adversary
can not get t secret shares, and thus can not reconstruct k.
Further, since sensors do not directly send their secret
shares ki to the group leader, (instead they bind their ki with
xi and the endorsed messages abstract d), the trafﬁc mon-
itoring does not give the adversary any chance to obtain the
secret shares. Note the communication channel between
sensors are encrypted to raise the security threshold and
defend against other security attacks, including message
injection and impersonate attacks.
One may wonder whether the compromised group lea-
der can generate the signature for the forged messages
because it can collect t partial signatures. This forged
signature generation attempt, again, will fail because the
partial signature submitted from each group member is
bind with the endorsed event. In particular, the message
abstract d is bind with each partial signature. If these partial
signatures are used on a forged message, ECPVS veriﬁ-
cation will fail and the forged message will be immediately
dropped by the forwarding sensors.
Finally, PDF scheme does not prevent the adversary’s
disruption attacks. The disruption attack happens when the
adversary (by compromising one or more sensors) inten-
tionally submits a corrupted partial secret or signature and
then disturbs the signature generation. As the result, the
generated threshold signature is invalid, and the legitimate
event report will be dropped by the forwarding sensors.
Several schemes have been proposed to identify the com-
promised sensors in prior studies [31–33], the security
solution for defending against the disruption or false neg-
ative attacks is still an open research problem [2], and is
considered as one of our future work. It should be
emphasized that the disruption attack may trigger the sys-
tem attention from the base station or sink because the
network abnormality can be detected if many legitimate
reports are dropped due to the attack. Then, the adminis-
tration personnel can physically locate the compromised
sensors and remove them from the network.
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Given the event report with system signature, any inter-
mediate forwarding sensor can easily verify the signature
and decide whether or not to drop the packet. Theoretically,
starting from the source node (s1) to the destination, only
one veriﬁcation is enough to ﬁlter the possible false data
packet. The signature veriﬁcation at every hop is not nec-
essary. However, considering the adversary’s DoS attack
can occur at any location in the network, one signature
veriﬁcation is not adequate because the adversary can
inject the false data after the node that veriﬁes the signa-
ture. Therefore, we propose the probabilistic false data
ﬁltering to balance the trade-off between computation
overhead and the DoS attack prevention.
We denote pf, a system wide parameter, as the en-route
veriﬁcation probability. Any intermediate forwarding sen-
sor, with the probability of pf, veriﬁes the system signature
byusingtheveriﬁcationmethodpresentedinSect. 4.2.The
verifying sensor ﬁrst calculates d ¼ hðejjVÞ; then deduces
R = rP - dQ (P is the base point, and Q is the system
public key). The value of X-coordinate of R is used to
recover C, which is the part of original message M. Finally,
the verifying sensor compares the redundant information in
C with V. The event report message will be regarded
authentic if the veriﬁcation is successful. Otherwise, the
message will be immediately dropped.
5 Performance evaluation
We evaluate our proposed PDF scheme by implementing all
componentsontherealworldexperimenttest-bed,including
sensor conﬁdential generation and pre-loading, security
communication channel establishing,randomsecret number
sharing, and threshold signature generation.
5.1 Experiment testbed and parameter setting
Our experiments use MICAz [34] motes as the sensor
platform. MICAz is powered by an ATmega128 micro-
controller, which features an 8MHz, 8-bit RISC CPU,
128K bytes ﬂash memory (ROM) and 4K RAM. The RF
transceiver on MICAz is IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee compliant,
and can achieve maximum 250kbps data rate. Our MICAz
motes run TinyOS [35] version 1.1.15.
We implement ECC public key primitives on MICAz
motes. We choose SECG recommended 160-bit elliptic
curve, secp160r1, in our ECC implementation. The 160-bit
ECC offers the same security level as the 1024-bit RSA
does [36], which is a more popular public key scheme and
widely used in e-commerce. The performance of threshold
signature generation and public key veriﬁcation directly
determines the performance of PDF. The current ECC
implementation in the public domain suffers very poor
performance if ported directly. It is reported in [37] that it
takes more than 30 s to generate a public key. To signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the computation time for ECC exponentia-
tion, we have adopted a number of optimization techniques
customized for the 8-bit architecture, including Hybrid
Multiplication and Pseudo Mersenne modular reduction for
large integer multiplication, Mixed Coordination for efﬁ-
cient ECC additions and doubling, etc. Due to the space
limit, this paper omits the detail description of the opti-
mizations. We refer interested readers to [38] for details.
We summarize the key performance results in Table 1.
We run the experiment in an ofﬁce room with the
dimension of 15 ft by 10 ft. The sensors are evenly placed
on a table with the average distance of 2ft with each other.
To achieve the better communication efﬁciency, we change
the default TinyOS data packet payload size to 68 bytes
(including 4-byte control information) from the original 29
bytes. This allows us to transmit an ECC public key (40
bytes) in one data packet. One possible trade-off for pay-
load size extension is that the packet may suffer trans-
mission errors more easily than that of the default size. As
the result, the communication efﬁciency can be affected
when packet loss happens. Our experiment results, how-
ever, show the packet loss is rare after the payload size
extension. It could be the reason that our sensor deploy-
ment condition is too ideal to show the difference after
payload size extension. It is one of our future work to study
the communication efﬁciency in an outdoor and realistic
deployment condition.
With all security components implemented, the program
has the code size (ROM) of 35,108 bytes and the data size
(RAM) of 2,648 bytes. Given the capacity of 128KB pro-
gramming (ROM) size and 4KB data (RAM) size, we only
use less than 30% of the programming size. The rest space
can be reserved for other applications or future expansion.
One may be concerned that we have consumed about 65%
of the data size so that other applications may have
memory shortage. One feasible solution is to move the
constant variables (for ECC parameters) from RAM to
on-board permanent storage (EPROM or ﬂash). Further,
more optimized and careful programming can also ease the
memory shortage.
Our evaluation focuses on the time consumption,
including the communication delay and the computation
Table 1 The performance 160-bit ECC on MICAz mote, including
ﬁx point multiplication (FPM), random point multiplication (RPM),
signature generation (Sign) and signature veriﬁcation (Verify)
Platform FPM RPM Sign Verify
MICAz 1.24 s 1.35 s 1.35 s 1.96 s
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123delay. We do not explicitly give the performance of power
consumption, because the combination of message com-
plexity and time consumption can always be approximately
translated to the power consumption. In the experiment, we
have also adopted the simple scheduling scheme so that the
probability for the packet corruption due to the collision is
very small. During the experiment, we repeat each test for
20 times, and record the average time consumption. We
ﬁnally discuss the PDF scheme message overhead and its
scalability when the network size grows.
5.2 Evaluation of local pair-wise key establishment
To build the secure communication channels, pair-wise
keys have to be established among the sensors. In the
implementation, we adopt the ECC-based pair-wise key
establishing scheme proposed in our previous work [39].
To ease the explanation, we show the slightly tweaked key
establishment protocol in Fig. 2. The adjustment is to
optimize the key establishing time consumption.
We suppose the key establishment protocol is running
between two neighboring sensors u and v. Each sensor is
pre-loaded with its public key and privacy key pair as long
as the system security credentials. For example, sensor u is
pre-loaded with qu, Qu and Cu, which are the private key,
the public key and the public key certiﬁcate, respectively.
Qu can be veriﬁed from Cu by following formula: Qu ¼
euCu þ Q; where eu ¼ hashðIDjjCuÞ; and Q is the system
public key. In general, Cu is used to verify the public key
Qu. Steps (1) and (2) of the protocol showed in Fig. 2
present how v veriﬁes u. Interested readers are referred to
[39] for detail explanation of the sensor certiﬁcate gener-
ation and veriﬁcation.
After verifying sensor u, sensor v immediately sends Yv
to u after generating Yv, so that the calculation of Rv by v
and quYv by u, the two time consuming ECC exponentia-
tion, can be performed simultaneously. In step (7) and (8),
only u, who has the private keyqu, can recover rv from nv:
Finally, u and v agree on rv as the secret key.
Our experiment shows it takes 4.1 s to share a pair-wise
key between two MICAz motes. The performance can be
improved under the circumstance. For example, Yv in step
(3) can be pre-computed. In that case, the optimized
scheme only takes 1.5 s to establish the secret between two
MICAz sensors.
In the next experiment, we test the time consumption for
multiple neighboring sensors to establish keys with other
sensors in the same neighborhood area (achieving full
connectivity). Since the ECC operation time is much
longer than the message transmission delay, we schedule
the communications among the sensors in such a way that
allows all sensors to do ECC operation simultaneously. In
particular, each sensor ﬁrst broadcasts its certiﬁcate and
public key. After all certiﬁcates and public keys are
received, the group of sensors simultaneously verify other
certiﬁcates and compute the challenges for all other parties.
Then, each sensor in turn transmits the challenges. After all
challenges are received, the group of sensors simulta-
neously decrypt the challenge, and ﬁnally establish the
pair-wise keys. Figure 3 shows the time consumption of
both pair-wise key establishing schemes for up to 16 sen-
sors. Even though the number of edges increase quadrati-
cally when the number of sensors increases, we ﬁnd the
overall time consumption for key establishment grows
linearly. This is because sensors compute ECC exponen-
tiation in parallel. When there are 16 sensors, it takes
around 35 s to achieve full key connectivity. Our optimized
key establishing scheme again shows the superior efﬁ-
ciency, it only takes 14 s to establish pair-wise key among
16 sensors, almost one third of time consumption compared
to non-optimized scheme.
5.3 Evaluation of threshold signature generation
In this subsection, we evaluate the false data ﬁltering per-
formance. We ﬁrst present the performance of the two
Fig. 2 ECC-based pair-wise key establishment scheme between two
neighboring sensors: u and v
4 6 8 1 01 21 41 6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Group Size: Number of Sensors
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
 
f
u
l
l
 
k
e
y
 
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
(
s
)
Optimized Key Est.
ECC−based Key Est.
Fig. 3 The time duration for multiple neighboring sensors to achieve
full key connectivity
1006 Wireless Netw (2010) 16:999–1009
123components in PDF: threshold signature generation and
signature veriﬁcation. We then use the results to estimate
the overall performance with different hop-by-hop authen-
tication probabilities.
It is important that, in the threshold signature generation,
the group of t local sensors need to share a different ran-
dom secret k for each signature. Therefore, we ﬁrst eval-
uate the cost for random secret (k) sharing. In the
experiment, we ﬁrst schedule all the motes to generate their
random secret polynomials simultaneously, as well as the
20 byte secret shares for each of the other sensors in the
group. Then, all the motes in turn unicast their secret shares
to the corresponding sensors. We measure the time con-
sumption in the whole process. The experiment results are
illustrated in Fig. 4. We ﬁnd the cost for sharing a random
secret is not negligible but reasonable. For a group of 8
sensors, it takes only 1.8 s. The time consumption increases
quadratically with the sensor group growing because the
key graph edges increase with Oðn2Þ (suppose n is the
number of endorsing sensors). As the result, the commu-
nication complexity is Oðn2Þ: For a sensor group with 16
nodes, it then takes 5.8 s to share a random k.
Note the random k sharing protocol can be executed in
the idle time before the event is detected, so that the ran-
dom secret can be immediately used for endorsing the
event upon detection. Therefore, the time duration for the
threshold signature usually does not include the time delay
for sharing k unless more than one different events occur
simultaneously at the same location. Based on the above
reason, our experiment for measuring the time delay for the
threshold signature generation does not include the random
k sharing time. We present the experiment results in Fig. 5.
In general, the threshold signature generation is efﬁcient
because each endorsing sensor only needs to do one ECC
point multiplication. With 8 local endorsing sensors, the
time duration is 2.3 s. The time linearly increases to 3.3 s
when the number of endorsing sensors becomes 16.
The system signature veriﬁcation is equivalent to an
ECC signature veriﬁcation operation. The veriﬁcation time
for an intermediate forwarding sensor is 1.96 s.
We are eager to investigate the overall performance of
PDF, including threshold signature generation and the
probabilistic false data ﬁltering. In our evaluation, we
assume that the event detecting sensors have already
established pair-wise key with their neighbor endorsing
sensors. We also assume these sensors have already shared
a random secret k, which is used to generate the threshold
signature. We ﬁx the number of endorsing sensors to 16.
Figure 6 demonstrates the overall performance of the false
data ﬁltering scheme under different hop-by-hop veriﬁca-
tion probabilities. As we can see, as long as the system
parameter is properly selected, e.g., the veriﬁcation prob-
ability is 10% or 20%, the overall performance of PDF is
reasonably practical. Given the event report destination
within less than 20 hops, the end-to-end delivery time is
less than 10 s. While the delivery distance increases to
50 hops, the delivery time moderately increases to around
20 s.
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1235.4 PDF message overhead and its scalability
In addition to the time delay, PDF scheme also introduces
extra messages to the sensor network. Since message
complexity analysis for each group sensor was presented in
the previous section, we here discuss the overall message
overhead that PDF brings to the system. The overall mes-
sage overhead is important because it shows how much
communication cost the system has to pay to deploy PDF
scheme to defend against the adversary’s DoS attack.
The extra messages required in PDF scheme are used to
share the random secret k, generate the group signature and
the event signature attached to each event report message.
Note we do not count the message overhead in pair-wise
key establishing because it provides basic security infra-
structure to the sensor network and can be included in any
other security scheme besides PDF. Suppose there are t
sensors in the group. As we indicated in the previous
section, to share a random secret k, each sensor needs to
send t - 1 messages, so t sensors totally send t(t - 1)
messages. As showed in Fig. 1, the signature generation
scheme, each group sensor sends two messages to the
group leader, and the group leader sends one message to
the rest of group. The number of message combined is
3(t - 1). In total, the number of extra messages to generate
a signature in PDF scheme is (t ? 3)(t - 1).
As the ECPVS scheme shows in Sect. 4.2, once the sig-
nature is generated, the group leader sends the event report
message in the format of (V, e, r), where V is the public part
of the message, e is the encrypted C, and r is the group
signature. Since the original message is CjjV; the extra part
sentinPDFschemeisjustr,whichhasthelengthof20bytes
in 160-bit ECC system. Note this overhead is counted as per
hop. If the average hop number is h, the total amount of
message overhead for signature transmission is 20h.
The above analysis reveals that the message overhead
for signature generation is not related to the network size,
and is only determined by the size of group (t). In event
report transmission, PDF puts 20 bytes overhead in each
event report. Considering that the average event report
delivery distance may increase when the network size
grows, PDF scheme may introduce the network size related
message overhead. This overhead, however, can be very
minimal as 20 bytes can be transmitted in the same mes-
sage with the moderate payload size inﬂation.
6 Conclusion
Compared to the symmetric-key based solutions, the pub-
lic-key based scheme offers much more solid security
resilience. However, it is a challenge to design and
implement the public-key scheme in resource constrained
sensor networks. In this paper, we show our effort in
designing the public-key based false data ﬁltering scheme
(PDF) in wireless sensor networks. Our scheme takes the
advantage of recent progress in efﬁcient implementation of
ECC primitives on sensor devices. PDF allows each event
report to be attached with a system signature jointly gen-
erated by a group of sensors nearby. This signature then is
conveniently and efﬁciently veriﬁed by forwarding sensors
along the routing path to the destination. We implemented
all security components in PDF on MICAz sensor motes
and run the protocol on our laboratory test bed. Our results
demonstrated that the event report signature can be gen-
erated and delivered to the destination within 20 hops in
10 s. This result also supports we are the ﬁrst to design and
implement the practical public-key based false data ﬁlter-
ing scheme in sensor networks.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank all the
reviewers for their insightful comments and kind guidances to
improve the paper. This project was supported in part by US National
Science Foundation grants CNS-0721443, CNS-0831904, and
CAREER Award CNS-0747108.
References
1. Yang, H., Ye, F., Yuan, Y., Lu, S., & Arbaugh, W. (2005, May).
Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks. Urbana-
Champaign, IL: Mobihoc.
2. Ye, F., Luo, H., Lu, S., & Zhang, L. (2004). Statistical en-route
ﬁltering of injected false data in sensor networks. INFOCOM.
3. Yu, Z., & Guan, Y. (2006, April). A dynamic en-route scheme for
ﬁltering false data in wireless sensor networks. INFOCOM’06,
Spain.
4. Zhu, S., Setia, S., Jajodia, S., & Ning, P. (2004, May). An
interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for ﬁltering of
injected false data in sensor networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE
symposium on security and privacy, Oakland, CA.
5. Zhang, Y., Liu, W., Lou, W., & Fang, Y. (2006). Location-based
compromise-tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor
networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
(Special Issue on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks), 24(2),
247–260.
6. Eschenauer, L., & Gligor, V. D. (2002, November). A key-man-
agementschemefordistributedsensornetworks.InProceedingsof
the9thACMconferenceoncomputerandcommunicationsecurity.
7. Chan, H., & Perrig, A. (2005, March). Pike: Peer intermediaries
for key establishment in sensor networks. Miami, FL: INFOCOM.
8. Chan, H., Perrig, A., & Song, D. (2003, May). Random key
predistribution schemes for sensor networks. In IEEE symposium
on Security and Privacy (pp. 197–213). Berkeley, California.
9. Du, W., & Deng, J. (2003). A pairwise key pre-distribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks. ACM CCS.
10. Liu, D., & Ning, P. (2003, October). Establishing pairwise keys
in distributed sensor networks. Washington, DC: ACM CCS.
11. Liu, D. & Ning, P. (2005). Improving key pre-distribution with
deployment knowledge in static sensor networks. ACM Trans-
action on Sensor Networks, 20, 1–32.
12. Traynor, P., Choi, H., Cao, G., Zhu, S., & T. L. Porta. (2006,
April). Establishing pair-wise keys in heterogeneous sensor net-
works. Barcelona, Spain: INFOCOM.
1008 Wireless Netw (2010) 16:999–1009
12313. Traynor, P., Kumar, R., Saad, H. B., Cao, G., & Porta, T. L. (2006,
June). Liger: Implementing efﬁcient hybrid security mechanisms
for heterogeneous sensor networks. Uppsala, Sweden: Mobisys.
14. Zhang, Y., Liu, W., Lou, W., & Fang, Y. (2005, March). Securing
sensor networks with location-based keys. New Orleans, Louisi-
ana: WCNC’05.
15. Kong, J., Zerfos, P., Luo, H., Lu, S., & Zhang, L. (2001). Pro-
viding robust and ubiquitous security support for mobile ad hoc
networks. In Proceedings of the ninth international conference on
network protocols (p. 251). Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Com-
puter Society.
16. Zhou, L., & Haas, Z. J. (1999). Securing ad hoc networks. IEEE
network, special issue on network security, 13(2), 24–30
17. Amis, A. D., Prakash, R., Vuong, T. H. P., & Huynh, D. T.
(2000). Max-min D-cluster formation in wireless ad hoc net-
works. INFOCOM.
18. Bandyopadhyay, S., & Coyle, E. (2003). An energy-efﬁcient
hierarchical clustering algorithm for wireless sensor networks.
INFOCOM.
19. Bannerjee, S., & Khuller, S. (2001). A clustering scheme for
hierarchical control in multi-hop wireless networks. INFOCOM.
20. Basagni, S. (1999). Distributed clustering algorithm for ad-hoc
networks. I-SPAN.
21. Chatterjee, M., Das, S. K., & Turgut, D. (2002). WCA: A
weighted clustering algorithm for mobile ad hoc networks.
Cluster Computing.
22. Heinzelman, W. R., Chandrakasan, A., & Baladrishnan, H.
(2002). An application-speciﬁc protocol architecture for wireless
microsensor networks. IEEE Transaction on Wireless Commu-
nication, 1(4), 660–670.
23. Younis, O. & Fahmy, S. (2004). Distributed clustering in ad-hoc
sensor networks. INFOCOM.
24. Intanagonwiwat, C., Govindan, R., & Estrin, D. (2000). Directed
diffusion: A scalable and robust communication paradigm for
sensor networks. MOBICOM.
25. Karp, B., & Kung, H. T. (2000). GPSR: Greedy perimeter
stateless routing for wireless neworks. MOBICOM.
26. Ferreira, A. C., Vilaa, M. A., Oliveira, L. B., Wong, H. C., &
Loureiro, A. A. (2005). Networking-ICN (pp. 449–458).
27. Newsome, J., Shi, E., Song, D., & Perrig, A. (2004). The sybil
attack in sensor networks: Analysis and defenses. IPSN.
28. Certicom. (2004). Code and cipher. Certicom’s Bulletin of
Security and Cryptography, 1(3), 1–5.
29. Shamir, A. (1979). How to share a secret. Communication of the
ACM, 22(11), 612–613.
30. Wang, H., Sheng, B., Tan, C. C., & Li, Q. (2008, June). Com-
paring symmetric-key and public-key based schemes in sensor
networks: A case study for user access control. In Proceedings of
ICDCS, Beijing, China.
31. Du, X. (2008). Detection of compromised sensor nodes in heter-
ogeneous sensor networks (pp. 1446–1450). Beijing, China: ICC.
32. Zhang, Q., Yu, T., & Ning P. (2008). A framework for identifying
compromised nodes in wireless sensor networks. ACM Transac-
tions on Information and System Security, 11(3), 1–37.
33. Zhang, Y., Yang, Y., Jin, L., & Li, W. (2006). Locating com-
promised sensor nodes through incremental hashing authentica-
tion. San Francisco, CA: DCOSS.
34. Crossbow Technology INC. Wireless sensor networks.
http://www.xbow.com/Products/Wireless_Sensor_Networks.htm.
35. Tiny OS. (2006). Tinyos 1.1.10. http://www.tinyos.net.
36. NIST. (2001, October). Key management guideline. In Workshop
document (DRAFT).
37. Malan, D. J., Welsh, M., & Smith, M. D. (2004, October). A
public-key infrastructure for key distribution in tinyos based on
elliptic curve cryptography. In The ﬁrst IEEE international con-
ference on sensor and ad hoc communications and networks,
Santa Clara, CA.
38. Wang, H., & Li, Q. (2006, December). Efﬁcient implementation
of public key cryptosystems on mote sensors (Short Paper). In
International conference on information and communication
security (ICICS). LNCS 4307 (pp. 519–528). Raleigh, NC.
39. Wang, H., & Li, Q. (2006). Distributed user access control in
sensor networks. San Francisco, CA: DCOSS.
Author Biographies
Haodong Wang is currently a
PhD candidate at Computer
Science Department in the Col-
lege of William and Mary. He
got his BS from Tsinghua Uni-
versity and MS from Penn State
University. His research inter-
ests are sensor network appli-
cations, security and privacy,
security schemes on resource
constrained devices, and wire-
less networks.
Qun Li is an assistant professor
in the Department of Computer
Science at College of William
and Mary. He holds a PhD
degree in Computer Science
from Dartmouth College. His
research interests include wire-
less networks, sensor networks,
RFID, and pervasive computing
systems. He received the NSF
Career award in 2008.
Wireless Netw (2010) 16:999–1009 1009
123